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INTRODUCTION
There is no doubt that for the Trump administration, immigration
enforcement and mass deportation are at the top of the agenda.1 Even
before taking office on January 20, 2017, United States President
Donald Trump (“President Trump”) vowed to deport all immigrants
with serious criminal records—the “bad hombres.”2 His
administration, however, has deported more than just Mexican
“criminals, drug dealers, and rapists.”3 Deportation, prolonged
 J.D. candidate, May 2019, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.A., Political Science and Spanish, University of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign, 2010. A special thank you to my family, friends, and professors for their
continuous support in my academic endeavors.
1
Even as a presidential candidate, President Trump promised to deport over
two million unauthorized immigrants which he argued had “committed crimes.”
Allissa Wickham, Trump's Plan to Deport 2M Immigrants Will Face Roadblocks,
LAW360, Nov. 16, 2016.
2
Id.; Kevin Penton, Even ‘Good Hombres’ Not Safe from Removal: 9th Circ.
Judge, LAW360, May 30, 2017.
3
See Penton, supra note 2; Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Donald Trump’s False
Comments Connecting Mexican Immigrants and Crime, THE WASH. POST, Jul. 8,
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detentions, denaturalization and family separation are but a few of the
challenges faced by the immigrant community in the Trump Era.4 The
Department of Justice, under President Trump, has aggressively
enforced federal immigration laws, invoking great fear in immigrant
communities across the nation.5
In response to this hardline position on immigration enforcement,
several jurisdictions throughout the United States declared themselves
“sanctuaries,” or reaffirmed their already in-place sanctuary status.6
Sanctuary jurisdictions in the United States are not a new concept,
they trace back to the 1980s.7 They originally emerged to protect
refugees with legitimate claims to asylum from federal immigration
enforcement.8 Today’s sanctuary jurisdictions limit the enforcement of
federal immigration laws against all immigrants with strong ties to the
community that have no serious criminal record. 9 Sanctuary policies,
however, vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.10
When a United States citizen is pulled over for a broken tail light,
they do not expect their lives to be significantly turned around.11 On
2015; Brian Bennett, Not Just ‘Bad Hombres’: Trump is Targeting up to 8 Million
People for Deportation, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2017.
4
In 2017, ICE arrested 37,670 individuals without criminal record by October,
a 125% increase from the prior year. Amanda Holpuch, I Live in Fear: Under
Trump, Life for America’s Immigrants Can Change in a Flash, THE GUARDIAN, Oct.
18, 2018.
5
Id.
6
See, e.g., Kore Rumore, Chicago’s History as a Sanctuary City, CHI. TRIB.,
Oct. 13, 2017; Jazmine Ulloa, California Becomes ‘Sanctuary State’ in Rebuke of
Trump Immigration Policy, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2017.
7
Elizabeth M. McCormik, Federal Anti-Sanctuary Law: A Failed Approach to
Immigration Enforcement and a Poor Substitute for Real Reform, 20 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 165, 173-74 (2016).
8
Id.
9
See Id.; see also, e.g., Ulloa, supra note 6.
10
See Rumore, supra note 6. For the City of Chicago being a sanctuary means
providing a safe home to all Chicagoans, regardless of his or her immigration status.
Chicago’s sanctuary policy is a “commitment to inclusion.” Id.
11
See Tamara Lyte, Increased Enforcement Threatens Undocumented
Immigrants, USA TODAY’S HISPANIC LIVING MAGAZINE, Sep. 23, 2017.
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the other hand, for an undocumented immigrant, this same situation
can be detrimental to his or her future.12 If they do not have a valid
driver’s license, they will be arrested and can be turned over to
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) for deportation, even
if they have no serious criminal record.13 Many times, this results in
prolonged detention periods by the local law enforcement, which
violates the individual’s due process rights.14 In 2012, Chicago Mayor
Emmanuel signed the “Welcoming City Ordinance” that ensured
undocumented immigrants are not arrested solely because of their
immigration status.15
Sanctuary policies such as the Welcoming City Ordinance of
Chicago threaten President Trump’s immigration enforcement
agenda,16 making them a target of his administration.17 On January 25,
2017, only five days after his inauguration, President Trump issued an
executive order requiring former U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions
(“Attorney General Sessions”) to ensure sanctuary jurisdictions were
not eligible to receive certain federal funding.18 It was an effort to
force sanctuary jurisdictions to cooperate in the enforcement of federal
immigration laws.19 This order, however was challenged in a federal
court in California where it was permanently enjoined.20
Despite these failed efforts, in July 2017 Attorney General
Sessions continued to threaten to withhold federal funding from
sanctuary jurisdictions that failed to cooperate in the enforcement of

12

See Id.
See Id.
14
See Id.
15
Rumore, supra note 4.
16
See Wickham, supra note 1.
17
See Rumore, supra note 6.
18
City of Chi. v. Sessions, 888 F.3d at 276-80 (7th Cir. 2018), reh’g en banc
granted in part, vacated in part, No. 17-2991, 2018 WL 4268817 (7th Cir. 2018)
and vacated, No. 17-2991 & 18-2649, 2018 WL 4268814 (7th Cir. 2018).
19
Id.
20
Id.
13
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federal immigration laws.21 He added three new conditions to the
Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (“Byrne Grant”).22
That grant provides state and local law enforcement agencies with
substantial funds for personnel, equipment, training and other
expenses.23 To continue to receive the Byrne Grant, Chicago and other
state and local jurisdictions were required to: (1) give immigration
agents unrestricted access to police stations; (2) give immigrations
agents at least forty-eight hour notice before a detainee was released;24
and (3) comply with a federal statute that encourages information
sharing between local law enforcement and federal immigration
agents.25
Chicago, like other jurisdictions, did not give up its sanctuary
policies.26 Mayor Emmanuel said, “We will never be coerced or
intimidated into abandoning our values as a welcoming city.”27
Instead, Chicago was the first to file a lawsuit against the Department
of Justice challenging these new conditions to the Byrne Grant,28
arguing that the conditions were unconstitutional.29
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois agreed with Chicago that the Executive Branch had
overstepped the authority granted to them by the United States
Constitution.30 On September 15, 2017, the district court granted in
part Chicago’s motion for preliminary injunction.31 The court held that
21

Id. at 276-77.
Id.
23
Id. at 276-280; City of Chi. v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933, 936 (N.D. Ill.
2017).
24
City of Chi., 888 F.3d at 276-77.
25
City of Chi., 264 F. Supp. 3d at 937.
26
Rumore, supra note 4.
27
Dianna Novak Jones, Immigration Info Law Unconstitutional in Sanctuary
City Row, LAW360, July 27, 2017.
28
Id.
29
City of Chi., 888 F.3d at 276-77.
30
Id.
31
City of Chi. v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933, 951 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
22
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two of the three conditions were unconstitutional: the access and
notice conditions.32 The district court found that Congress had not
authorized Attorney General Sessions to impose these conditions in
the first place.33 Attorney General Sessions appealed the preliminary
injunction to the access and notice conditions.34
On April 19, 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit (“Seventh Circuit”) affirmed the lower court’s
decision.35 In reviewing the decision, the Seventh Circuit underlined
that the issue before it was separation of powers and not immigration
policy.36 The Seventh Circuit found that the Executive Branch’s
actions were an “usurpation of power” because there was no
congressional authorization for its actions and there was evidence that
Congress repeatedly refused to impose conditions that tied funding to
immigration policies.37 Judge Rovner said: “We are a country that
jealously guards the separation of powers, and we must be evervigilant in that endeavor.”38
The three-judge panel agreed that the notice and access conditions
imposed by the Attorney General Sessions were unconstitutional as
lacking congressional authorization.39 Judge Manion, however,
disagreed that the injunction should be applied nationally, and instead
believed the injunction should be limited to Chicago.40 He argued that
imposing a nationwide injunction on these issues was beyond the

32

Id.
Id. at 951.
34
City of Chi., 888 F.3d at 276-77.
35
Id. at 293.
36
Id. at 277.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 295 (Manion, J, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
33

part).
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scope of the Seventh Circuit.41 He believed that national injunctions
should only be applied when “absolutely necessary.”42
Attorney General Sessions appealed the scope of the injunction,
and asked the Seventh Circuit to limit the injunction to Chicago.43 In
June 2018, the Seventh Circuit granted the Attorney General’s request
to limit the preliminary injunction.44 The Seventh Circuit, however,
did not address the issue of whether courts have the power to grant
nationwide injunctions.45
This article will examine the Seventh Circuit’s decision in City of
Chicago v. Sessions in the context of two core principles of this nation,
separation of powers and federalism. This article argues that the
Seventh Circuit correctly decided that the notice and access conditions
to the Byrne Grant were beyond the scope of power of the Executive
Branch. Furthermore, this article argues that if the Seventh Circuit had
reviewed the lower court’s decision on the third condition, it would
have found the third condition unconstitutional, as the district court
later did in issuing a permanent injunction against all three conditions.
Part I of the article examines the history of sanctuary jurisdictions
and the principles of separation of powers and federalism. Part II of
the article examines the decision in City of Chicago v. Sessions,
arguing that the Seventh Circuit correctly decided that the access and
notice conditions to the Byrne Grant were unconstitutional. Part II also
reviews the decisions of other courts regarding the conditions placed
on the Byrne Grant by Attorney General Sessions and the executive
order issued by President Trump trying to withhold federal funding
from sanctuary jurisdictions. Part III looks at the how different courts
decided and reviewed the third condition to the Byrne Grant. Finally,
Part III discusses how the Seventh Circuit should have decided on the
third condition had it been raised on appeal.
41

Id.
Id. at 300.
43
City of Chi. v. Sessions, No. 17-2991, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 21801, at *3-4
(7th Cir. June 4, 2018).
44
Id.
45
Id.
42
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A. Background: Sanctuaries, separation of powers, and federalism in
the Trump Era.
1. The History of Sanctuary Jurisdictions.
Sanctuary jurisdictions are not a new concept; they trace back
to the 1980s.46 The first sanctuary jurisdictions declared themselves
sanctuaries to protect refugees with legitimate claims to asylum from
federal immigration enforcement.47 Since then, sanctuary jurisdictions
have emerged to protect immigrant communities across the nation.48
However, sanctuary jurisdictions today differ in that they go beyond
protecting refugees.49 Generally, sanctuary jurisdictions today declare
themselves sanctuaries to demonstrate they stand in solidarity with the
immigrant communities within their jurisdiction.50 There is no one
definition for sanctuary jurisdictions, but one thing has held true of
sanctuary jurisdictions throughout time: they limit the enforcement of
federal immigration laws against non-criminal immigrants with strong
ties to the community.51
In the Trump Era, immigrant communities throughout the United
States have been under constant attack.52 President Trump has kept his
candidacy promises of: (1) mass deportation; (2) removal of Obama
immigrant-friendly policies; and (3) extend the wall at the border of
Mexico and the United States.53 In his first few weeks in office,
President Trump issued anti-immigrant policies, including the initial
46

McCormik, supra note 5, at 173-74.
Id.
48
Marco J. Crocetti, Leon Fresco, and Marissa C. Serafino, Analyzing the
Legality of Proposed Sanctuary City Measures, LAW360, Jan. 25, 2017.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
See Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and Civil Rights in the Trump
Administration: Law and Policy Making by Executive Order, 57 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 611, 628-30 (2017).
53
Id.
47
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travel ban, which became known to many as the “Muslim ban.”54
These and other polices by his administration invoked great fear in
immigrant communities throughout the United States, including
policies that separate children from their parents.55
In response to these xenophobic policies, several jurisdictions
throughout the United States declared themselves sanctuary cities or
reaffirmed their sanctuary status.56 Because sanctuary jurisdictions
limit the enforcement of federal immigration laws, they too have
become a target of the Trump administration and have not been spared
from scrutiny in President Trump’s tweets.57 President Trump has
taken active steps to keep his campaign promise to block funding to
sanctuary jurisdictions.58
a. Congress’ response to sanctuary jurisdictions: The two statutes.
The Trump administration is not the first branch of government
to try to overcome sanctuary jurisdictions’ unwillingness to enforce
federal immigration laws.59 In 1996, Congress enacted two statutes, §
1644 and § 1373, in response to a rise in sanctuary jurisdictions.60
Both statutes were created to facilitate information sharing between
the federal government and the state and local governments on issues

54

Id. at 630. Trump signed the initial travel ban, which suspended the
admission of all refugees and of individuals from seven predominantly Muslim
countries, days after being inaugurated. Id.
55
Over two thousand migrant children were separated from their parents when
they were apprehended by immigrant officials at the border in 2018. David S.
Rubenstein, Immigration Blame, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 178 (2018).
56
See Rumore, supra note 4. On November 13, 2016, Chicago Mayor Ram
Emmanuel, reaffirmed Chicago’s stance as a “Welcoming City.”
57
Alyssa Garcia, Much Ado About Nothing?: Local Resistance and the
Significance of Sanctuary Laws, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 185, 186-87 (2018).
58
Id.
59
McCormick, supra note 5, at 174-76.
60
Id.
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of immigration.61 Congress’ intent, however, was to encourage but not
require this type of communication.62
Section 1644 prohibited state and local governments from
restricting information sharing that would help the federal government
enforce federal immigration laws.63 While section 1373, encouraged
state and local governments to share information that would help the
federal government with the enforcement of immigration laws and
policies.64 Since these provisions were enacted, courts have limited
their scope.65 These provisions were used as a tool to try to overcome
sanctuary jurisdiction policies in court.66 Courts found that state and
local laws requiring cooperation with federal authorities regarding the
sharing of immigration information were not preempted by federal
law.67 Despite the small victory, most attempts to overcome sanctuary
jurisdictions through these provisions failed.68 The provisions were
found to authorize the free communication between local and state
officials and the federal authorities regarding information that could
help enforce federal immigration laws.69 They were meant to prevent
61

Id.
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
See Doe v. New York City, 860 N.Y.S.2d 841, 844 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 2008)
(finding that § 1373 does not impose an affirmative duty to report immigration
information to federal authorities); Johnson v. Hurt, 893 F. Supp. 2d 817, 840 (S.D.
Tex. 2012) (finding that Congress’ intent in § 1373 was to create a “nationwide
system of voluntary information sharing” to assist with federal enforcement of
immigration laws).
66
McCormick, supra note 5, at 194.
67
See Fonseca v. Fong, (finding that a state statute requiring local law
enforcement to report certain individuals believed to be undocumented immigrants
to federal authorities was not preempted by federal law).
68
See Sturgeon v. Bratton, 174 Cal. App. 4th 1407, 1415-16 (2009) (finding
that a statute prohibiting local officials from asking an individual’s immigration
status for the sole purpose of learning their status was not preempted by federal law
because it did not prohibit the communication of information to federal authorities,
and thus was not in conflict with federal law).
69
McCormick, supra note 5, at 199-200.
62
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states from placing obstacles against this type of communication;70
however, the provisions did not require this communication, nor did
they permit it when other federal laws protected the information, such
as privacy laws.71 Therefore, even after the enactment of these
provisions, sanctuary jurisdictions continued to exist and prevail.72 If
Congress chose not to require sanctuary jurisdictions to cooperate with
the enforcement of federal immigration laws, can the Executive
Branch require compliance? Does the Executive Branch have the
power to defeat sanctuary jurisdiction’s policies?
2. A core principle: Separation of powers.
Separation of powers is a core principle of this nation.73 The
framers of the U.S. Constitution specifically built a system of checks
and balances to prevent any one branch from becoming too
powerful.74 Yet, since the nineteenth century, the scope of the
Executive Branch has been greatly broadened.75 Both Democratic and
Republican presidents alike have used the “executive pen” to issue
executive orders that carry out their agendas, especially when dealing
with issues of immigration.76 In fact, since President Trump took
office in 2017, he has signed over seventy-seven executive orders,
including multiple versions of the travel ban.77 President Trump signed
more executive orders in his first one hundred days in office than any
other recent president.78 To put this in perspective, consider that the
70

Id.
Id.
72
Id.
73
City of Chi. v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 277 (7th Cir. 2018).
74
Id.
75
Tara L. Branum, President or King? The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders
in a Modern-Day America, 28 J. LEGIS. 1, 2-5 (2002).
76
Id.
77
Leada Gore, How many executive orders has President Trump signed?,
REAL TIME NEWS FROM AL.COM, July 30, 2018.
78
Id.
71
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first twenty-four presidents issued 1262 executive orders
collectively.79 This heavy use of the executive pen has raised the
question of what is the scope of the Executive Branch?80 The Trump
administration has been before the courts on this issue more than
once.81
The framers of the U.S. Constitution were determined to build a
system different than the one they escaped.82 The framers wanted to
ensure that they did not fall under the rule of another tyrant king, so
they created a system that ensured history would not repeat itself in the
United States.83 First, the framers divided the power of the federal
government into three separate branches: judicial, executive, and
legislative.84 They tasked each branch with specific responsibilities
and granted them specific powers to carry out those responsibilities.85
Next, the framers created a system of checks and balances to prevent
any one branch of the federal government from becoming too
powerful.86 Each branch of government has ways to check the power
of the other two branches.87
This system of checks and balances has withstood the test of time
and has, for the most part, functioned as the framers intended.
Generally, the branches have operated in balance with one another.
The power of the Executive Branch, however, has been greatly
expanded and continues to be expanded to date. So, does the
79

Branum, supra note 65, at 9-10.
See Id.
81
See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2399 (2018); City of Chi. v. Sessions,
888 F.3d 272, 277 (7th Cir. 2018).
82
Branum, supra note 65, at 10-12.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 15. The legislative branch would create the law, the Executive Branch
would enforce the law, and the judicial branch would interpret the law. Id.
86
Id.
87
Id. For example, the president has the power to veto a legislative bill
presented by Congress. The judicial system can declare laws created by Congress or
actions taken by the President unconstitutional. In turn, the President checks the
courts by through his power to appoint judges.
80
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Executive Branch have the power to condition federal funding to
compel states to comply with the enforcement of federal immigration
laws? If so, who or what gives the Executive Branch that power? This
is exactly the issue that was brought before the Seventh Circuit in City
of Chicago v. Sessions, but before reviewing the court’s decision in
that case, it is important we discuss another fundamental principal of
United States law, federalism. Can the federal government coerce
states to enforce federal laws?
3. Federalism.
There is no doubt that federalism places a limitation on
congressional power when it threatens the sovereignty of the states.88
In New York v. United States89 and Printz v. United States90, the
Supreme Court held that the federal government could not compel
states to enforce federal laws. In 1996, however, the Second Circuit
distinguished the two anti-sanctuary federal statutes from both cases.91
The court found that Congress had not forced state and local
governments to enact or enforce federal regulatory programs.92 Does
federalism prevent the Executive Branch from conditioning federal
funds to compel state and local governments to enforce federal
immigration laws? If the Executive Branch had the authority to
condition federal funding the way it did, would federalism protect
sanctuary cities?
B. The Seventh Circuit’s review of City of Chicago v. Sessions.
Chicago has been a sanctuary jurisdiction since 1982, when
several Chicago churches harbored refugees protecting them from
88

(2003).

Peter J. Henning, Misguided Federalism, 68 MO. L. REV. 389, 389-391

89

505 U.S. 144, 212 (1992).
521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997).
91
McCormick, supra note 5, at 185-86.
92
Id.
90
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enforcement of federal immigration laws.93 In 2006, Chicago codified
its sanctuary city policies with the enactment of its welcoming
ordinance.94 That same year the federal government established the
Byrne Grant, which provides state and local law enforcement
substantial funds for criminal justice expenses.95 For years, Chicago
received federal funding through the Byrne Grant without any issues.96
Over the years, several bills have been introduced in the House of
Representatives and the Senate attempting to condition federal grants
in a way that would coerce states and local governments to cooperate
with the enforcement of federal immigration laws; however, none of
these bills have become law.97 On January 25, 2017, President Trump
issued an executive order requiring Attorney General Sessions to
ensure that sanctuary jurisdictions were no longer eligible to receive
certain federal funding, including the Byrne Grant.98 This order was
challenged in a federal court in California where it was permanently
enjoined.99
After President Trump’s order was enjoined, Attorney General
Sessions directly issued three conditions to the Byrne Grant, again
attempting to coerce states and local governments to comply with the
enforcement of federal immigration laws.100 The three conditions
were: notice, access, and compliance.101 The notice condition required
local law enforcement to notify federal agents in advance when they
scheduled the release of individuals suspected to be in violation of
federal immigration laws.102 The access condition required local law
93

Rumore, supra note 4.
See CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, MUN. CODE § 2-173-005 et seq. (2007).
95
City of Chi. v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 276-80 (7th Cir. 2018); City of Chi.
v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933, 936 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
96
City of Chi. v. Sessions, 888 F.3d at 276-80.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
City of Chi. v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933, 937 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
94
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enforcement to give federal agents access to its detention facilities and
detained individuals.103 The final condition required local law
enforcement to comply with federal statute § 1373, which prevents
local and state governments from restricting information sharing
between local law enforcement and federal immigration agents.104
Chicago challenged all three conditions to the Byrne Grant in
federal district court, because these conditions directly conflicted with
its sanctuary policies.105 Chicago argued that these conditions were
unconstitutional and asked the district court to issue a preliminary
injunction for all three conditions.106 The district court agreed with
Chicago that the notice and access conditions were unlawful and
issued a nationwide preliminary injunction for those conditions.107 The
court held that Attorney General Sessions had no authority to issue
those conditions, and that any efforts to impose the conditions violated
the separation of powers and were ultra vires.108 The district court,
however, did not grant a preliminary injunction for the compliance
condition.109
This case was brought before the Seventh Circuit, on appeal by
Attorney General Sessions for the notice and access conditions.110 The
third condition was not reviewed by the Seventh Circuit.111 Attorney
General Sessions argued that the lower court’s decision was wrong
because he had statutory authority to impose the access and notice
conditions.112 He said that his authority for his actions came from a
statute defining the duties and functions of the Attorney General.113 He
103

Id.
Id.
105
Id. at 936.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
City of Chi. v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 282 (7th Cir. 2007).
109
City of Chi., 264 F. Supp. 3d at 936.
110
City of Chi., 888 F.3d at 276-80.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 282-84.
113
Id.
104
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specifically pointed to a section of the statute that reads, “[t]he
Attorney General shall exercise such powers and functions . . . ,
including placing special conditions on all grants, and determining
priority purposes for formula grants.”114 The Seventh Circuit said
Attorney General Sessions’ interpretation of this statute was contrary
to Congress’ intent.115 Furthermore, the Court pointed out that this
section of the statute would be an odd place for Congress to grant such
a power.116
The Seventh Circuit stressed that the issue before them was one of
separation of powers and not immigration policies.117 In reviewing
whether the Executive Branch had the power to withhold federal
funding from sanctuary jurisdictions, the Court first turned to the U.S.
Constitution, which exclusively provides that the power of the purse
belongs to Congress.118 The Attorney General, however, did not
contend that the Executive Branch has inherent power to condition
grants.119 Instead, Attorney General Sessions argued that his power to
condition federal funding originated with Congress, but was delegated
to him.120 The Seventh Circuit agreed that Congress can delegate
certain powers to the Executive Branch, but disagreed with the
Attorney General that Congress did so in this situation.121
To determine whether the Executive Branch overstepped its
power, the Court analyzed whether Congress delegated the power to
condition the federal funding in question to the Executive Branch.122
First, the Court looked to the statute, to determine if there was an
explicit grant of power from Congress.123 The statute does not
114

Id. at 284 (quoting 34 U.S.C. 10102(a)(6) (West 2017)).
City of Chi., 888 F.3d at 276-80.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 277.
118
Id.
119
Id. at 283.
120
Id.
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Id. at 286.
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Id. at 283-86.
123
Id.
115
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explicitly grant the Executive Branch the power to withhold federal
funding for the Byrne Grant.124 The Seventh Circuit acknowledged
that the statute granted Attorney General Sessions with some powers
typically reserved for Congress, but the Court concluded that none of
the provisions in the statute gave him the authority to impose such
conditions on federal funding.125
The Seventh Circuit also addressed this issue from a separation of
powers stand point.126 The Court was concerned that if the Executive
Branch could not only determine policy, but also enforce it, then there
would be no check against tyranny – the very reason our founders
even created a system with separation of powers.127 Judge Rovner
said, “[i]t falls to us, the judiciary, as the remaining branch of
government, to act as a check on such usurpation of power.”128
1.

The Ninth Circuit’s review of City & County of San
Francisco v. Trump

The Ninth Circuit, like the Seventh Circuit, found that the
Executive Branch violated the separation of powers principle, “an
integral part of the Founder’s design.”129 However, the court reached
this determination on a slightly different matter.130 Instead of
reviewing the conditions placed on the Byrne Grant by Attorney
General Sessions, the Ninth Circuit reviewed President Trump’s
Executive Order 13,768, signed on January 25, 2017.131 Like Attorney
General Sessions conditions on the Byrne Grant this executive order
was intended to withhold federal funding from sanctuary

124
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Id.
126
Id. at 277.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
City & Cnty. of S.F. v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1231-32 (9th Cir. 2018).
130
Id.
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Id.
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jurisdictions.132 The executive order required the Attorney General to
ensure that any jurisdiction that refused to comply with 8 U.S.C §
1373 was not eligible to receive federal grants.133 The Ninth Circuit
found that President Trump’s executive order “direct[ed] the agencies
of the Executive Branch to withhold funds appropriated by Congress
in order to further the Administration's policy objective of
punishing cities and counties that adopt so-called ‘sanctuary’
policies.”134
The Ninth Circuit conducted a similar analysis to the Seventh
Circuit in reaching its decision.135 The President’s power “must stem
either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.”136 The
court looked first to the U.S. Constitution to determine who has the
power to condition federal grants.137 The Ninth Circuit pointed out that
the power of the purse is an “exclusive congressional power.”138 The
court found that the President’s “power [was] at its lowest ebb” here
because Congress had not delegated to the President the power to
condition new federal grants with compliance of 8 U.S.C § 1373.139
The Ninth Circuit stressed that the Trump administration “ha[d] not
even attempted to show that Congress authorized it to withdraw
federal grant[s]” from sanctuary jurisdictions.140 Furthermore, the
court pointed out that Congress had repeatedly rejected legislation that
aligned with the goals of President Trump’s order.141 The Ninth Circuit

132

Id.
Id.
134
Id. at 1233.
135
Id. at 1232-35.
136
Id. at 1233 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 585(1952)) (internal quotations omitted).
137
City & Cnty. of S.F. v. Trump, 897 F.3d at 1232-35.
138
Id. at 1231.
139
Id. at 1233-34 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 637 (1952)) (internal quotations omitted).
140
City & Cnty. of S.F. v. Trump, 897 F.3d at 1234.
141
Id.
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found that the Executive Branch had “claimed for itself Congress's
exclusive spending power.”142
Without congressional authorization, the Ninth Circuit held that
the Executive Branch could not refuse to issue federal grants to
sanctuary cities.143 Therefore, on August 1, 2018, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the lower court’s decision in part.144 The Ninth Circuit
remanded the case only for the reconsideration of the scope of the
injunction.145
While the Ninth Circuit reviewed a slightly different matter, its
decision focused on the same core principle of separation of powers.
Both cases dealt with the Executive Branch, under President Trump,
attempting to withhold federal funding from jurisdictions that did not
help enforce federal immigration laws. One court reviewed the
Attorney General’s actions in reaching this goal, while the other
reviewed the President’s similar actions. What is important is that both
courts reached the conclusion that Congress controls federal spending,
and not the Executive Branch, and that Congress has not delegated that
power to the Executive Branch. 146 The Ninth Circuit also agreed with
the Seventh Circuit that the Executive Branch could only withhold
federal funding from sanctuary jurisdictions if it had congressional
authorization.147 Therefore, finding Executive Order 13,768
unconstitutional.148 Additionally, two other district courts have found
against the Executive Branch on similar issues for the same reason: the
power of the purse belongs to Congress and Congress has not
delegated that authority to the Executive Branch.149 The U.S. Supreme
Court has yet to weigh in on this issue.
142
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Id. at 1231.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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See City of Seattle v. Trump, No. 17-497-RAJ, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
173376, at *26-27 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 19, 2017) (finding President Trump’s order
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C. The third condition: Compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373.
In 1996, Congress enacted 8 U.S.C § 1373, a statute that
encouraged communication between state and local governments and
the federal government regarding individual’s immigration status.150
The statute was meant to facilitate information sharing between the
federal government and the state and local governments on issues of
immigration.151 Congress’ intent, however, was not to require such
communication.152 Section 1373 simply encouraged state and local
governments to share information that would help the federal
government with their efforts of enforcing immigration laws and
policies.153 Nonetheless, this statute was used as a tool to try to
overcome sanctuary jurisdiction policies in court.154 But most attempts
to overcome sanctuary jurisdictions through this statute failed.155
Courts found the statute to authorize the free communication between
local and state officials and the federal authorities regarding
information that could help enforce federal immigration laws.156 They
were meant to prevent states from placing obstacles against this type

conditioning funding to sanctuary cities unconstitutional); City of Phila. v. Sessions,
309 F. Supp. 3d 289, 344 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (finding the three conditions imposed by
the Attorney General invalid and in violation of both statutes and the U.S.
Constitution).
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
McCormick, supra note 5, at 194.
155
See Sturgeon v. Bratton, 174 Cal. App. 4th 1407, 1415-16 (2009) (finding that a
statute prohibiting local officials from asking an individual’s immigration status for
the sole purpose of learning their status was not preempted by federal law because it
did not prohibit the communication of information to federal authorities, and thus
was not in conflict with federal law).
156
McCormick, supra note 5, at 199-200.
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of communication;157 however, the provisions do not require this
communication.158
On January 25, 2017, only five days after his inauguration,
President Trump issued an executive order requiring the Attorney
General to ensure that any jurisdiction that refused to comply with 8
U.S.C § 1373 was not eligible to receive federal grants.159 This order
was challenged in a federal court in California where it was
permanently enjoined.160 The Ninth Circuit held that the executive
order violated the separation of powers principle.161 The Ninth Circuit
said that the Executive Branch could not refuse to issue federal grants
to sanctuary cities without congressional authorization.162
In July 2017 Attorney General Sessions threatened that federal
funding to sanctuary jurisdictions would be withheld if those
jurisdictions failed to cooperate in the enforcement of federal
immigration laws.163 He added three new conditions to the Byrne
Grant: notice, access, and compliance.164 The third condition required
local and state jurisdictions to comply with federal statute § 1373 that
encourages information sharing between local law enforcement and
federal immigration agents.165
On September 15, 2017, a district court found that the three new
conditions of access and notice were unconstitutional.166 The district
court applied a preliminary nationwide injunction on those conditions,
but not the third condition.167

157

Id.
Id.
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Id.
160
City of Chi. v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 276-80 (7th Cir. 2018).
161
City & Cnty. of S.F. v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1231-32 (9th Cir. 2018).
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Id. at 1231.
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City of Chi. v. Sessions, 888 F.3d at 276-77 (7th Cir. 2018).
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Id.
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City of Chi., 264 F. Supp. 3d at 937.
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Id.
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Id. at 951.
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Attorney General Sessions appealed the preliminary injunction to
the access and notice conditions.168 The Seventh Circuit, however, did
not review the constitutionality of the third condition.169 If the Seventh
Circuit had reviewed the third condition it would have found that
condition unconstitutional for the same reason it found the other two
conditions unconstitutional. First, the power of the purse exclusively
belongs to Congress. Second, Congress has not delegated this power to
the Executive Branch. When issuing the preliminary injunction, the
district court did not find there was sufficient evidence at that time to
find the third condition unconstitutional. The court had a more difficult
time finding that condition unconstitutional because the condition is
based on a statute. However, when deciding whether to grant the
permanent injunction the district court found that the third condition
was also unconstitutional on the same grounds it found the other
conditions unconstitutional. For those reason, the district court granted
the permanent injunction against all three conditions, including the
condition of compliance. Similarly, other district courts have found the
compliance condition unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
During President Trump’s campaign, he vowed to deport all
immigrants with serious criminal records, but his administration has
deported more than just the “Mexican drug dealers, criminals, and
rapist.” The Trump administration has taken an aggressive stance in
enforcing federal immigration laws, and to advance this hardline
position on immigration enforcement, President Trump issued an
executive order conditioning federal funding trying to force sanctuary
jurisdictions to cooperate in the enforcement of federal immigration
laws. When the order was enjoined by a federal court in California,
former Attorney General Sessions placed three conditions on the
Federal Byrne Grant, requiring jurisdictions to comply with federal
immigration enforcement laws.
168
169

City of Chi., 888 F.3d at 276-77.
See City of Chi. v. Sessions, 888 F.3d at 276-77 (7th Cir. 2018).
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Separation of powers is a core principle of this nation. The
framers of the U.S. Constitution specifically built a system of checks
and balances to ensure that no branch would become too powerful.
Yet, since the nineteenth century, the scope of the Executive Branch
has been greatly broadened. In recent years, that scope has broadened
further through the President’s use of executive orders. The scope of
the Executive Branch’s power has repeatedly been a question before
the courts under the Trump administration, especially in terms of
immigration policies. Does the U.S Constitution grant the Executive
Branch the power to withhold federal funding from jurisdictions that
do not enforce federal immigration laws? If not, who gave the
Executive Branch that authority?
The U.S. Constitution leaves no doubt that the power of the purse
belongs to Congress and not the Executive Branch. While Congress
can, it has not authorized the Executive Branch to condition federal
grants in this manner. In fact, Congress has repeatedly refused
legislation that ties federal funding to immigration laws, including
legislation proposed by the 115th Congress. Plain and simple,
President Trump’s executive order and Attorney General Sessions’
conditions to the Byrne Grant, violated the U.S. Constitution’s
principle of separation of powers. Multiple federal courts have found
President Trump’s order and Attorney General Sessions’ conditions to
federal funding at least partially unconstitutional on this ground. The
Seventh Circuit in City of Chicago v. Sessions, found two of Attorney
General Sessions’ conditions to the Byrne Grant unconstitutional. The
Seventh Circuit described the Executive Branch’s actions as a
“usurpation of power.”170 Judge Rovner stressed: “We are a country
that jealously guards the separation of powers, and we must be evervigilant in that endeavor.”171
I could not agree more with the Seventh Circuit: no one branch
should have all that power. The Executive Branch tried to resolve a
broken immigration system with a stroke of pen, but pushing
xenophobic policies is not the answer. And, the Executive Branch
170
171

City of Chi. v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 277 (7th Cir. 2018).
Id.
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cannot expect state and local governments to want to enforce such
extreme, harsh policies, policies that rip young children out their
parent’s arms. A broken immigration system will not be resolved
overnight, much less by a single executive order. Violating the core
principles of separation of powers and federalism are not the solution.
Congress and the Executive Branch must work together to resolve this
issue, but this issue will never be fixed if our government continues
acting based on party lines. If the federal government wants state and
local governments to enforce federal law, the branches must work
together to pass non-xenophobic legislation that fixes our immigration
system.
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